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This thesis investigates potential government cooperation between radical right-wing parties 
and center-right parties in Western Europe. First, the accuracy of open minimal range theory, 
a coalition theory that asserts that the ideological distance between parties determines which 
parties will form a coalition, is tested on the basis of a comparison to other coalition theories’ 
accuracy. Second, this thesis contributes to the longstanding academic debate on the 
dimensionality of political competition by exploring whether open minimal range theory 
proves to be more accurate if a two-dimensional model of political competition is used instead 
of a one-dimensional model. The findings demonstrate that open minimal range theory is more 
accurate than other coalition theories in predicting potential government cooperation with the 
radical right. In general, policy-oriented coalition theories, which take into account ideological 
considerations, are much more successful in predicting formation processes than office-
oriented theories, which do not do take into account policy. The one-dimensional model of 
political competition proves to be more accurate than the two-dimensional model, calling into 
question the assertion that political competition nowadays takes place along more than one 
dimension. 
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1. Introduction 
Radical right-wing parties have become increasingly successful electorally in Western Europe 
from the 1990s onward. From the breakthrough of the Danish People’s Party (DF, Dansk 
Folkeparti) in 1997 to the Austrian Freedom Party’s (FPÖ, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) 
recent electoral upset in the 2016 Austrian presidential election, radical right-wing parties’ 
emergence and success has drastically altered political party systems across Western Europe. 
In many countries, government cooperation between center-right parties and radical right-wing 
parties has taken place. In other countries, however, center right-wing declined to form such 
coalitions. Radical right-wing parties’ inclusion in governments does not necessarily 
correspond with their amount of electoral support. The radical right-wing Finns Party (PS, 
Perussuomalaiset), for instance, received 19.1% of the seats in the 2011 Finnish parliamentary 
election and did not engage in government cooperation, whereas the Danish People’s Party 
(DF, Dansk Folkeparti) obtained but 12.6% of the seats in the 2010 Danish parliamentary 
election yet did subsequently engage in government cooperation. This begs the question: why 
are radical right-wing parties sometimes accepted as partners for government cooperation in 
some cases, while being rejected in other cases? 
The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, in order to answer the aforementioned question, 
this study tests the validity of open minimal range theory, a theory based on the idea that the 
ideological distance between parties determines which parties will form a coalition. It does so 
by comparing open minimal range theory to four other coalition theories. Second, this thesis 
explores whether cases of coalition formation provide insight in the dimensionality of Western 
European party systems, juxtaposing a one-dimensional and a two-dimensional model of party 
competition against each other. Thereby, it aims to contribute to the longstanding academic 
debate on this question (Kriesi et al. 2006; Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009). 
The research question, which will be expounded on in a separate section, is formulated 
as follows: “Does the ideological gap between parties explain the variation in government 
cooperation outcomes between center-right parties and radical right-wing parties in Western 
Europe?” Center right-wing parties are parties that identify as liberal, agrarian, conservative or 
Christian Democratic. Radical right-wing parties are nationalist anti-establishment parties that 
are characterized by nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde 2007, 16-22). 
Government cooperation is defined as a form of inter-party cooperation that is necessary to 
uphold a majority for a government and its core policies. It does not require that radical right-
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wing parties be officially part of a government. The ideological gap is the distance between 
parties on one or multiple political dimensions. 
This thesis argues that center-right parties include a radical right-wing party in 
government cooperation if this party is ideologically closer than other parties. It is the 
ideological distance that decides which parties are included in a government. The coalition with 
the smallest ideological range consisting of the least possible partners, while still having a 
parliamentary majority, will eventually be formed. However, the ideological distance between 
parties can be measured in several ways. Most research on radical right-wing parties’ inclusion 
in governments has used a one-dimensional model (De Lange 2012, 902). This thesis 
investigates whether calculating parties’ ideological positions on the basis of a two-
dimensional model leads to more accurate findings by comparing the results of a one-
dimensional model to those of a two-dimensional model. If one of the models proves to be 
more accurate than the other model, this could deepen insight in the dimensionality of party 
competition in Western Europe. 
The findings of this study confirm that open minimal range theory is more successful 
in explaining the variation of government cooperation outcomes between the center right and 
the radical right than other coalition theories. However, the theory is fallible too: in some cases, 
it makes wrong predictions. One can conclude that the ideological gap cannot explain all cases, 
but plays an important role in many coalition formations. More importantly, coalition theories 
that take into account ideological considerations are much more successful at predicting the 
variation of government cooperation outcomes than coalition theories that do not do so. In 
regard to the dimensionality of political competition, the results of this study convey that the 
one-dimensional model of political competition is more successful in predicting government 
cooperation with the radical right than the one-dimensional model. On the basis of this thesis, 
the assertion that political competition in Western Europe nowadays takes place along two 
dimensions, as put forward by Kriesi et al. (2006, 921), among others, cannot be supported. 
 
2. Literature 
2.1 Coalition theory 
Various approaches have been employed in studying government cooperation between the 
center right and the radical right. A distinction can be made between two such approaches. On 
the one hand, some scholars assume that mainstream parties treat radical right-wing parties 
differently than other parties because of radical right-wing parties’ alleged specific 
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characteristics, most importantly the idea that they would pose a threat to liberal democracy 
(Mudde 2004, 541). On the other hand, approaches on the basis of “coalition formation theory” 
assume that, all else being equal, mainstream parties treat radical right-wing parties similar to 
other parties (Dodd 1976, 40; De Lange 2012, 901).1 This study falls in the latter category: 
open minimal range theory assumes that radical right-wing parties might constitute a specific 
party family, yet other parties treat radical right-wing parties exactly the same as non-radical-
right parties, all else being equal. It is the ideological gap of a potential coalition between a 
radical right-wing party and center right-wing parties that determines whether government 
cooperation between these parties will take place. Dodd’s “coalition formation theory” assumes 
that “there are no a priori constraints which circumscribe or inhibit the negotiation and coalition 
between any two parties” (Dodd 1976, 40). In reality, however, some parties are a priori 
excluded from government cooperation; still, “coalitionability” of all parties is assumed to be 
the standard (Laver & Schofield 1990, 201; De Lange 2012, 901). 
 Within coalition theory, one can look at coalition formation from an office-seeking 
perspective and from a policy-seeking perspective. The office-seeking perspective assumes 
that parties seek to maximize their relative weight in the coalition (De Lange 2012, 902-903). 
From this assumption, several theories are derived. Minimal winning theory entails that parties 
seek to form governments without actors that are unnecessary for upholding a majority, which 
maximize the government’s total weight without delivering any benefits (De Swaan 1973, 51-
52). Most governments that are formed are minimal winning coalitions. However, this theory 
is not sufficiently specific: it often predicts that multiple combinations of parties would be 
minimal winning coalitions but fails to explain why one of these potential coalitions is 
eventually formed (De Lange 2012, 902). Therefore, two more specific theories have been put 
forward. First, minimum size theory predicts that the minimal winning coalition with the 
smallest number of seats will be formed: thereby, parties maximize their relative weight in the 
coalition by diminishing the number of seats occupied by other coalition parties (Riker 1962, 
42-43). Second, bargaining proposition theory predicts that the minimal winning coalition with 
the smallest number of parties will be formed (Leiserson 1970, 90). 
 The policy-seeking perspective assumes that parties enter coalitions in order to realize 
their preferred policies. In order to do so, they cooperate with parties that are closest to them 
in terms of ideological distance. From this perspective, two specific theories have been put 
                                                          
1 From this point onward, the terms “coalition formation theory” and “coalition theory” will be used 
interchangeably.  
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forward. Minimal connected winning theory predicts the formation of minimal winning 
coalitions that are ideologically “closed”, which means that all coalition partners are adjacent 
on a policy scale (Axelrod 1970, 170). Minimal range theory predicts that the coalition with 
the smallest amount of “ideological diversity” between the two potential government partners 
that are ideologically furthest away from each other will be formed (De Swaan 1973, 71-74). 
It exists in a closed version, which predicts the formation of the minimal connected winning 
coalition with the smallest ideological range, and in an open version, according to which the 
coalition does not have to consist of parties that are connected: the minimal winning coalition 
with the smallest ideological range will be formed. 
 De Lange (2012) uses both policy-oriented theories and office-oriented theories and 
looks at the formation of ten governments in which center parties cooperated with radical right-
wing parties. Her findings underpin that government cooperation between center right parties 
and radical right-wing parties, indeed, takes place because of office-seeking and policy-seeking 
behavior of center right parties (De Lange 2012, 914). Minimal winning theory, minimal 
connected winning theory and minimal range theory all predict many of the cases in which 
government cooperation with the radical right took place. However, De Lange did not take into 
account cases in which cooperation did not take place, even if she states that minimal range 
theory “seems particularly well placed to distinguish (…) between situations in which [radical 
right-wing parties] join government coalitions and situations in which they are not able to 
realize their office aspirations, because it hardly ever predicts the inclusion of [radical right-
wing parties] in government coalitions when this has not occurred” (De Lange 2012, 904).2 
Because of the fact that she did not take into account such cases, this assertion is worth 
researching and forms the basis of this study’s examination of the accuracy of open minimal 
range theory. In order to find out whether this theory is truly “particularly well-placed” to 
distinguish between cases in which government cooperation with the radical right takes place 
and cases in which such cooperation does not take place, the accuracy of open minimal range 
theory is compared to the accuracy of other theories, using the same cases. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 De Lange does not provide a source for this statement, although she does mention that between 1981 and 2008 
there have only been three cases in which minimal range theory predicts the formation of a government yet such 
a government was not formed (2012, 916). It is also not clear whether she uses open minimal range theory or 
closed minimal range theory when she mentions and uses minimal range theory. 
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2.2 The dimensionality of party competition 
There is much discussion about the number of dimensions along which political competition 
in Western European party systems takes place. Earlier research on radical right-wing parties’ 
inclusion in governments, for instance by De Lange (2012), often solely employed a general 
left-right dimension. However, Kriesi et al. find that political competition in Western European 
countries is increasingly shaped by another dimension. They characterize the new political 
dimension as one between the “winners and losers of globalization” and argue that this is the 
case because the process of globalization creates a conflict between those who benefit from 
this process and those who mainly experience its downsides (2006, 921). On similar grounds, 
Kitschelt and McGann identify a division between “authoritarianism” and “libertarianism” 
(1995, 85-87). Hooghe, Marks and Wilson label this dimension “GAL/TAN”, where GAL 
stands for “Green/alternative/libertarian” and TAN for “traditional/authoritarian/nationalism” 
(2002, 976). 
Proponents of the idea of two-dimensionality argue as follows. First, parties compete 
on the basis of a socio-economic left-right dimension, along which parties that advocate more 
government intervention are placed on the left and parties that advocate less government 
intervention are placed on the right. Second, a new socio-cultural dimension has emerged over 
the past decades (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson 2002, 976).3 Across Western Europe, new themes 
that are not of a solely economic nature have gained prominence on the political agenda, such 
as European integration, the environment and immigration. A fundamental notion behind the 
idea of this new political dimension is that parties’ stance on these “new” issues is coherent, 
which means that parties in favor of more environmental regulation are supportive of the 
process of European integration and of fewer restrictions on immigration. 
 However, the idea of the two-dimensionality of Western European party systems has 
not gone uncriticized. Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009, 309) argue that voters’ preferences 
are indeed structured along both an economic and a socio-cultural dimension, but that party 
competition still takes place on a one-dimensional basis. According to them, the existing left-
right division between parties has subsumed the aforementioned new political issues. 
Environmentalism, for instance, is associated with and championed by the political left, 
                                                          
3 According to Kriesi et al. (2006), competition in Western European party systems was already organized along 
both an economic and a socio-cultural dimension before the emergence of GAL/TAN-related issues. They hold 
that these issues have not created a new dimension, but simply transformed the already existing socio-cultural 
dimension. This idea is theoretically compatible with Hooghe, Marks and Wilson’s conceptualization of the 
GAL/TAN dimension, which also takes into account “traditional” issues that are (partly) of a socio-cultural 
nature, such as defense policy. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether GAL/TAN issues 
constitute a new dimension or have transformed an existing dimension. 
8 
 
whereas right-wing parties have come to support more restrictive immigration policies. Van 
der Brug and Van Spanje question Kriesi’s methodology, which uses content analysis of 
newspaper editorials in order to estimate parties’ positions. On the basis of expert surveys, Van 
der Brug and Van Spanje find that Western European party systems are still structured one-
dimensionally. Given the results of their study, it is good to be wary of the caveats of assuming 
that political competition takes place along two dimensions, for this might not necessarily be 
the case. 
In comparing the accuracy of open minimal range theory to the accuracy of other 
theories, this study employs a one-dimensional model to examine whether several coalition 
theories can predict both cases of cooperation and cases of non-cooperation: this one-
dimensional approach is in line with most existing research. However, given the ongoing 
scientific dispute on this issue, it also seems relevant to compare the accuracy of a one-
dimensional model to the accuracy of a two-dimensional model. For this reason, the second 
part of this study explores whether a two-dimensional model is more accurate in predicting the 
outcomes of coalition formation processes than a one-dimensional model. There are ample 
grounds to assume so, not only because radical right-wing parties’ emergence is often 
explained on the basis of this new dimension, but also because “ideological gaps” between 
center right-wing parties and radical right-wing parties on the GAL/TAN dimension might 
provide an explanation for cases in which center-right parties do not cooperate with radical 
right-wing parties. Does cooperation not occur because radical right-wing parties are too far on 
the TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalism) side of the socio-cultural dimension compared 
to center-right parties? Or have radical right-wing parties been too enthusiastic in applying the 
“new winning formula” and shifting to the left on the economic dimension, thereby moving too 
far away from center-right parties and creating a large economic ideological gap with these 
parties? (De Lange 2007, 411) The explorative second part of this study, in which the accuracy 
of a one-dimensional model of political competition is compared to the accuracy of a two-
dimensional model, is solely conducted on the basis of open minimal range theory. 
It is expected that a two-dimensional model provides a more sophisticated view on the 
ideological gap between center right parties and radical right parties than a one-dimensional 
model. In a one-dimensional model, vast differences between center right parties and radical 
right-wing parties can cancel each other out and make the ideological gap seem smaller than it 
is. The hypothetical example in table 1, using a one-dimensional left-right model from 0 (far 
left) tot 10 (far right), can explain this. On the issue of privatization of state companies, radical 
right-wing party X holds the centrist position 5 while center right party Y has a neoliberal 
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orientation and holds position 9. On immigration, radical right-wing party X holds the extreme 
position 9 and center right party Y holds position 5. In this case, the average score of both 
parties will be 7. Despite the fact that the parties have a clearly different orientation on both 
issues, the ideological gap between the two parties will be 0. This example shows that a one-
dimensional model might predict government cooperation between the center right and the 
radical right even if the ideological gap is, in reality, rather large. 
 
Table 1: One-dimensionality 
 Privatization Immigration Left-right 
placement 
Ideological 
gap with 
center 
right 
Radical right 
party X 
5.0 9.0 7.0 0.0 
Center right 
party Y 
9.0 5.0 7.0 n/a 
Left-wing 
party Z 
4.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 
The ideological gap between the center right and the radical right is 0.0. The ideological gap between the center 
right and the left is 3.0. On the basis of this one-dimensional model, assuming that the center right has a majority 
with either the left or the radical right, the center right would choose to cooperate with the radical right. 
By contrast, table 2 displays that by employing a two-dimensional model (with scales from 0 
to 10 on the economic left-right and the socio-cultural GAL/TAN dimensions) in which 
privatization is considered an economic issue and immigration a socio-cultural issue, the 
ideological dissimilarities between the center right and the radical right are taken into account.  
In the two-dimensional model, the ideological gap between two parties is measured on the basis 
of the Pythagorean theorem: a²+b²=c² (Benoit & Laver 2007). The difference between the two 
parties on the left-right dimension constitutes a², the difference on the GAL-TAN dimension 
constitutes b². The square root of c² is the ideological distance between the two parties. In the 
above example, employing a two-dimensional model leads to a different prediction: on the 
basis of this model, in which the ideological gap between two parties is measured on the basis 
of the Pythagorean theorem, the ideological gap between the center right and left-wing party Z 
is smaller than the gap between the center right and the radical right. Therefore, it is expected 
that a coalition between the center right and the left be formed. 
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Table 2: Two-dimensionality 
 
 
Privatization Immigration Left-right 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Ideological 
gap with 
center 
right 
Radical right 
party X 
5.0 9.0 5.0 9.0 (4²)+(4²) = 
32. √32 = 
5.7 
Total: 5.7 
Center right 
party Y 
9.0 5.0 9.0 5.0 n/a 
Left-wing 
party Z 
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 (5²)+(1²) = 
26. √26 = 
5.1 
Total = 5.1 
The ideological gap between the center right and the radical right is 5.7, based on a difference of 4.0 on both the 
left-right and the GAL/TAN dimension. The ideological gap between the center right and the left is 5.1, based on 
a difference of 5.0 on the left-right dimension and 1.0 on the GAL/TAN dimension. On the basis of this two-
dimensional model, assuming that the center right has a majority with either the left or the radical right, the center 
right would choose to cooperate with the left. 
In short, while a one-dimensional model has often proved to be useful in studying radical right-
wing parties’ inclusion in coalitions, it also seems fruitful to include a two-dimensional model 
and juxtapose it against the one-dimensional model. By doing so, potential problems with the 
one-dimensional model can be highlighted and insight can be gained in the factors that 
determine whether center-right parties include the radical right. An additional, empirical 
advantage of employing both models is that differing outcomes between the two models, with 
one model proving to be more accurate than the other, might indicate that this model best 
reflects the dimensionality of party competition in Western Europe. 
 
3. Research question, methodology and case selection 
The research question of this study is as follows: “Does the ideological gap between parties 
explain the variation in government cooperation outcomes between center-right parties and 
radical right-wing parties in Western Europe?” The independent variable is the ideological gap, 
conceptualized as the distance between parties on one or two political dimensions. A small gap 
indicates small policy differences between parties. This gap is calculated on the basis of the 
distance between the parties in a potential coalition that are ideologically furthest away from 
each other: this difference constitutes the ideological gap of a potential coalition.4 The 
                                                          
4 In the two-dimensional model, the parties that are ideologically furthest away from each other can be different 
on the two dimensions. Consider the following example. A potential coalition consists of parties A, B and C. 
Party A has position 7.0 on the left-right dimension and position 5.5 on the GAL/TAN dimension. Party B has 
position 6.0 on the left-right dimension and position 6.5 on the GAL/TAN dimension. Party C has position 8.0 
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dependent variable is the variation in government cooperation outcomes between center-right 
parties and radical right-wing parties. The two potential outcomes are cooperation with the 
radical right and non-cooperation with the radical right. 
The main proposition of this study is that if the ideological gap of a coalition between 
the radical right and the center right is smaller than the ideological gap of a coalition between 
the center right and other parties, government cooperation between the center right and the 
radical right will take place. On the other hand, if the ideological gap of a coalition between 
center-right parties and other parties is smaller than the gap of a coalition between center-right 
parties and radical right-wing parties, center-right parties will choose not to engage in 
government cooperation with the radical right. Because of the fact that governments generally 
need parliamentary majorities or at least cannot survive if a parliamentary majority opposes 
them, this study defines potential formation processes as formation processes in which the 
center right and the radical right have a majority of seats in parliament. If this is not the case, 
government cooperation between the center right and the radical right will not take place, at 
least not without the inclusion of parties that are not center right. It is important to note that 
open minimal range theory does not exclude the possibility of radical right-wing parties 
engaging in government cooperation with non-center-right parties. However, in Western 
Europe this has not happened yet.5 Moreover, the logic of policy-oriented coalition theory 
dictates that radical right-wing parties will not be likely to form a coalition with non-right-wing 
parties, since the ideological gap between the radical right and such parties is generally large.6 
Therefore, I limit myself to studying government cooperation between the radical right and the 
center right in this thesis. Nevertheless, cooperation between the radical right and non-center-
right parties could happen in the future and fits within the framework of open minimal range 
theory. 
First, this study compares open minimal range theory to other coalition theories, arguing 
that center-right parties will engage in government cooperation with radical right-wing parties 
                                                          
on the left-right dimension and position 7.5 on the GAL/TAN dimension. On the left-right dimension, parties B 
and C are furthest away from each other, amounting to an ideological gap of 2.0, whereas on the GAL/TAN 
dimension, parties A and C are furthest away from each other, also amounting to an ideological gap of 2.0. The 
total ideological gap of the coalition is the square root of (2²)+(2²)=8. √8= 2.8. 
5 Except for Switzerland, where the radical right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP, Schweizerische Volkspartei) 
is in government with both center right and non-right-wing parties. However, Switzerland is a special case 
because of the fact that the parties that engage in government cooperation remain the same after each election. 
The country has a political system that does not allow for good comparisons with other Western European 
political systems: the system is assembly independent, which means that the government is elected by 
parliament, but cannot be removed by parliament (Shugart & Carey 1992, 26). 
6 Though more so on the basis of one-dimensional models than on the basis of two-dimensional models. 
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if minimal winning coalitions with radical right-wing parties have a smaller ideological gap 
(meaning that the parties are ideologically closer to each other) than minimal winning 
coalitions with other political actors. The underlying assumption is that parties are policy 
seeking. Government cooperation with ideologically close partners increases parties’ chances 
to implement their preferred policies. Therefore, parties will form coalitions with the smallest 
policy range. If the ideological gap of a coalition between the radical right-wing party and the 
center-right party is larger than the ideological gap of a coalition between the center right and 
other parties, the center-right party will engage in government cooperation with these other 
parties. This is even the case if the radical right-wing party is technically ideologically adjacent 
to the mainstream party in the party system (table 3 displays a hypothetical example of such a 
case). After all, if there is a large ideological gap between two adjacent parties, while non-
adjacent parties are ideologically closer to a certain party, open minimal range theory expects 
cooperation with these non-adjacent parties to be more beneficial for this party. 
 
Table 3: Hypothetical example of the rationality of coalitions with non-adjacent parties 
Party Left-right 
(0-10) 
ideological 
placement 
Ideological gap 
with center 
right 
Percentage of seats 
Socialist Left 1.2 4.3 12 
Green Party 3.7 1.8 25 
Social Democrats 4.4 1.1 10 
Christian Democrats 5.5 n/a 28 
Radical Right Party 9.2 3.7 25 
The Christian Democrats can only form a minimal winning coalition with the Radical Right Party or with the 
Green Party. The gap between the center right Christian Democrats and the Radical Right Party (3.7) is larger 
than the gap between the Christian Democrats and the Green Party (1.8). In this case, the Christian Democrats 
would prefer to form a coalition with the non-adjacent Green Party (without including the Social Democrats; the 
coalition, after all, has to be minimal winning) instead of forming a coalition with the adjacent Radical Right 
Party. This shows that open minimal range theory does not require parties to be adjacent. The coalition does not 
have to be “connected”; the minimal winning coalition with the smallest policy range will be formed. 
 
By applying open minimal range theory, insight can be gained about parties’ motives to form 
coalitions with radical right-wing parties. If open minimal range theory proves to have a high 
explanatory value, this would indicate that mainstream parties are policy-oriented when 
forming coalitions. It would also indicate that radical right-wing parties are not treated 
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differently than other parties in the coalition formation process: if radical right-wing parties are 
not included because of their “ideological extremism”, it is not because they are radical right-
wing parties, but because of the large ideological gap between the radical right-wing party and 
the center-right. Because of the fact that this study treats radical right-wing parties as similar 
to other parties, any findings might also be relevant for coalition formation theory in general. 
This study is conducted on the basis of the comparative method, employing the most 
similar systems design. The unit of analysis is the potential coalition formation process between 
the center right and the radical right. The cases included in this study resemble each other in 
almost all aspects, except for the outcome of the formation process: in some cases cooperation 
between the center right and the radical right did take place, in other cases this did not occur. 
The most similar systems design is used because almost all “background variables” of the 
potential formation processes are similar, except for the dependent variable – in some instances 
there has been cooperation, in other instances cooperation did not occur – and the independent 
variable, namely the ideological gap (Lijphart 1971, 685-687). Because the geographical scope 
of the analysis extends to party systems across Western Europe, the “small N problem”, which 
comparative studies often have to overcome, does not pose a problem to this study: sixteen 
cases in six countries have been selected, rendering the findings of this study reliable and 
generalizable. 
The methodology of the first part of this thesis is largely based on a study by De Lange 
(2012). She researched whether various coalition theories were able to predict cases in which 
a coalition between center-right parties and radical right-wing parties was formed. In two 
respects, this study goes one step further: it explicitly tests open minimal range theory, and it 
also takes into account cases in which no coalition with the radical right was formed. Put 
differently, De Lange studied whether coalition theories applied to actual coalitions between 
the radical right and the center right, whereas this thesis studies whether coalition theories can 
predict the outcome of formation processes in cases where the radical right and the center right 
could potentially form a coalition, including cases where a coalition between the center right 
and the radical right was ultimately not formed. The percentage of coalitions predicted 
correctly by open minimal range theory is compared to the percentage of coalitions predicted 
correctly by other theories. By including cases where government cooperation did not take 
place, this thesis’s methodology differs from De Lange’s methodology. In order to compare 
the accuracy of open minimal range theory to the accuracy of other coalition theories, I 
therefore calculate the accuracy of four other coalition theories for the same cases as used for 
open minimal range theory, allowing for the best comparison between the theories. By 
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juxtaposing open minimal range theory against other coalition theories and studying whether 
it is more accurate than these theories, the central question can be answered: is it the ideological 
gap between parties that determines whether cooperation will take place? In line with existing 
research, I do so by using a one-dimensional model. 
Second, after comparing the accuracy of open minimal range theory to the accuracy of 
other theories on the basis of the one-dimensional model, this thesis employs both a one-
dimensional and a two-dimensional model in order to explore whether the assumption that the 
two-dimensional model is more accurate than the one-dimensional model holds water. I 
compare the accuracy of the two models and then proceed to analyze, on a case-by-case basis, 
why both of the models sometimes failed to correctly predict the outcome of coalition 
formation processes. In doing so, this study “looks beyond the percentages and the figures” 
and seeks to provide more insight in the advantages and disadvantages of both models. 
In six states, this thesis examines all government formation processes in which the 
center right and the radical right obtained a majority. The theory tested in this study, open 
minimal range theory, is a specification of minimal winning theory, which requires that 
“coalitions that are not winning are excluded from consideration” (De Swaan 1973, 71). 
Therefore, only potential coalitions with a parliamentary majority are taken into account. The 
starting point is 1999, when the radical right-wing Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ, Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs) engaged in government cooperation with the center right, the first radical 
right-wing party to do so (Duncan 2010, 337-338).7 The six countries included are as follows: 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.8 These countries are 
exemplary for Western Europe for several reasons. They are all parliamentary democracies, as 
is the norm in Western Europe. Moreover, in all these countries, strong radical right-wing 
parties have emerged and won at least 5 percent of the parliamentary seats, leaving center-right 
parties with the choice whether to cooperate with the radical right or with other parties. In all 
of these systems, maintaining a parliamentary majority is necessary for governments to stay in 
                                                          
7 Unfortunately, this excludes the Austrian cases of 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1995, in which the FPÖ and the ÖVP 
also obtained a majority. De Lange (2012, 916) states that in the cases of 1986 and 1990 government 
cooperation would have been minimal winning, but does not mention where she obtained the data on the left-
right placement of these parties. Because of the fact that I do not seem to be able to obtain these data either, I 
exclude them. 
8 In Norway, the center right and the radical right received a parliamentary majority in 2001 too, and 
subsequently formed a coalition. However, data for the 2001 Norwegian case were not available; at that time, 
the CHES dataset only included EU member states. Therefore, only the 2013 Norwegian case is included. 
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office.9 However, in none of these countries, radical right-wing parties have a specific 
regionalist or secessionist agenda.10 Such a focus, which is country-specific and not inherent 
to radical right-wing parties’ outlook, would potentially influence outcomes in terms of 
coalition participation and hinder the possibility to generalize any findings. The cases included 
in this study are displayed in table 4. 
Table 4: Formation processes included in this study 
Country Cases 
Austria 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008 
Denmark 2001, 2005, 2007, 2015 
Finland 2011, 2015 
Netherlands 2002, 2003, 2010 
Norway 2013 
Sweden 2010, 2014 
Years in bold font indicate that a coalition with the radical right was formed. Years not in bold font indicate such 
a coalition was not formed, despite center right and radical right-wing parties having a parliamentary majority. 
In cases where a coalition with the radical right was formed, I calculate whether open minimal 
range theory would predict the formation of this coalition, or that the formation of another 
coalition would be predicted. In cases where no coalition with the radical right has been formed, 
I also calculate whether open minimal range theory would predict the formation of a coalition 
with the radical right, or whether the coalition that was eventually formed would be more 
logical on the basis of open minimal range theory.11 In all cases, both with in the one-
dimensional model and in the two-dimensional model, the ideological gap of a coalition with 
the radical right is juxtaposed against the ideological gap of a coalition without the radical right 
that has the smallest ideological gap: only if the gap of a coalition with the radical right is 
smaller, such a coalition will be formed. 
 To determine parties’ ideological positions, I use the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 
(CHES). Together with election manifesto analysis, expert surveys like CHES are often used 
                                                          
9 The Swiss assembly-independent political system diverges too much from the Western European norm to be 
included: the Swiss government is elected by parliament, but cannot be removed by parliament (Shugart & 
Carey 1992, 26). 
10 As opposed to the Belgian Flemish Interest (VB, Vlaams Belang) and Italian Northern League (LN, Lega 
Nord) parties, which are regionalist/separatist. 
11 De Lange (2012, 916) notes that until 2008, there have only been three instances in which coalitions with the 
radical right would be predicted by minimal range theory, yet have not been formed. This is an indication of the 
value of minimal range theory. However, in many countries, radical right-wing parties’ strength has increased 
considerably since 2008, so it seems fruitful to study this again and see whether minimal range theory still 
explain why coalitions with the radical right are not formed. It is also worth noting that De Lange did not use 
open minimal range theory. 
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in order to measure the ideological distance between parties. As De Lange (2012, 903) points 
out, expert surveys “come with a certain weight and legitimacy, give a timely account of a 
party’s positions, are quick, easy and comprehensive, and generate highly comparable and 
standardized data”. The CHES surveys, conducted by Steenbergen and Marks in 1999, by 
Hooghe et al. in 2002 and by Bakker et al. in 2006, 2010 and 2014, provide an estimate of 
Western European parties’ positions on a number of variables, including “left-right general”, 
“left-right economy” and “GAL/TAN”. The survey prior to the formation process is used to 
determine parties’ ideological positions: for instance, Danish parties’ positions in the 2001 
general election are based on the 1999 expert survey. The two-dimensional model consists of 
a left-right economic axis and a GAL/TAN socio-cultural axis: the variables are named “left-
right economy” and “GAL/TAN” in the CHES dataset. The one-dimensional model uses solely 
a left-right axis, which is all-encompassing and includes themes that would be on the 
GAL/TAN axis in the two-dimensional model. Here, the CHES variable “left-right general” is 
used. 
 To provide insight into the predictive power of open minimal range theory, the results, 
expressed as the percentage of coalitions predicted correctly, are compared to those of four 
other coalition theories that were used by De Lange’s 2012 study: minimal winning theory, 
minimal connected winning theory, bargaining proposition theory and minimum size theory 
(De Lange 2012, 905).12 This thesis tests the explanatory power of open minimal range theory 
by comparing it to the accuracy of other coalition theories, which serve as an indicator of 
whether open minimal range theory is relatively successful or relatively unsuccessful in 
correctly predicting formation outcomes.  
If the explanatory value of open minimal range theory proves to be higher than the 
accuracy of all the other coalition theories, one can conclude that the ideological gap is an 
especially good indicator of whether a coalition with the radical right is formed. If the 
explanatory value of open minimal range theory is higher than 50% but not higher than the 
best-performing other coalition theory, this would indicate that the ideological gap plays a role, 
but that it is not necessarily a better explanation than those provided by other theories. If the 
explanatory value of open minimal range theory is below 50%, it fails to predict the majority 
of cases; therefore, one can conclude that the ideological gap might play a role, but is not a 
particularly important determinant of whether cooperation will take place. 
                                                          
12 These theories are explained in subsection 2.1 of this study. 
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 The comparison between the two dimensions is of a more explorative nature; therefore, 
no such benchmarks have been included here. Instead, in this section the thesis researches the 
advantages and disadvantages of both models by distinguishing between cases that are 
predicted correctly by both models, cases that are predicted correctly by only one of the models 
and cases that are predicted wrongly by both models.  
 
4. Results 
This section is structured as follows. First, the findings of the comparative analysis between 
open minimal range theory and other coalition theories on the basis of the one-dimensional 
model, displayed in table 5, are discussed. Second, the findings of the explorative comparison 
between the one-dimensional model and the two-dimensional model on the basis of open 
minimal range theory, which are presented in table 6, are analyzed. In both tables, “predicted” 
and “not predicted” refer to the accuracy of the prediction of the theories. If government 
cooperation with the radical right did not take place, yet one of the theories or models predicted 
that such cooperation would take place, “not predicted” means that the coalition theory or 
model of dimensionality has failed to predict that no cooperation would take place. It does not 
mean that the theory or model has (successfully) predicted that government cooperation with 
the radical right would not take place. It is important to note that “predicted” or “not predicted” 
pertain to the formation of a government with the radical right. The question that lies at the 
root of these tables is therefore: “Did this theory or this model successfully predict whether 
cooperation with the radical right would eventually take place?” If one of the theories or models 
predicts that a government with the radical right will not be formed, and a government without 
the radical right that, for other reasons, cannot be explained by the theory or model is formed, 
the theory or model still succeeded in predicting that government cooperation with the radical 
right would not take place. However, even if the prediction might in that case be correct, the 
formation of a government that cannot be explained by a theory does, of course, pose real 
problems to the validity of this theory or model, and potentially even calls into question the 
validity of coalition theory as a whole. After all, the logic behind coalition theory does not 
distinguish between potential cooperation with the radical right and any other type of 
government cooperation. Such cases will be discussed in the dimensionality-related second 
part of this section. The calculations for all the 16 cases are included in the appendix. 
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4.1 Coalition theory 
As displayed in table 5, the total accuracy of open minimal range theory is 68.8%.13 Thereby, 
in this study, it is the theory most successful in predicting whether cooperation with radical 
right-wing parties will take place. The second most accurate theory is minimal winning theory, 
which proves to be accurate in 62.5% of the cases. Minimal connected winning theory 
successfully predicts 56.3% of the cases, whereas the two other theories are clearly less 
accurate. It is remarkable that open minimal range theory appears to be inaccurate in cases 
where no cooperation with the radical right takes place: in all cases without cooperation except 
for one, the theory predicts that cooperation would take place. This contradicts De Lange’s 
assertion that minimal range theory “hardly ever predicts the inclusion of [radical right-wing 
parties] when this has not occurred” (2012, 904). By contrast, open minimal range theory is 
highly successful in predicting that cooperation will take place when it does occur. While 
minimal winning theory appears to be almost as accurate as open minimal range theory, one 
should keep in mind that in every case, many coalitions can be minimal winning coalitions; by 
contrast, open minimal range theory solely predicts the formation of one coalition in every 
case. Therefore, it is more of a feat for open minimal range theory to be this accurate. 
 Minimum size theory is clearly the weakest of the theories. By predicting the formation 
of the minimal winning coalition with the smallest number of seats, it fails to take into account 
policy considerations. Its accuracy, while already low, is inflated because of the fact that in 
four cases it happens to predict correctly that no cooperation would take place. Bargaining 
proposition theory has a similar problem: by not taking into account ideology and predicting 
the formation of the minimal winning theory with the smallest number of parties, it often 
follows that a coalition between two large, potentially adversarial parties should be formed. As 
with minimal size theory, its accuracy is inflated by predicting “correctly” cases in which no 
cooperation would take place, even if the coalition eventually formed was not the coalition that 
the theory predicted. 
 In conclusion, open minimal range theory is the most accurate theory in this study. In 
general, the coalition theories that take into account ideological considerations, i.e. open 
minimal range theory and minimal connected winning theory, are remarkably more accurate 
than the theories that do not do so. The two worst-performing theories, minimum size theory 
and bargaining proposition theory, do not take into consideration policy. Not taking into 
account policy considerations yet often accurate, minimal winning theory is an exception to 
                                                          
13 On the basis of the one-dimensional model. 
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this pattern. However, a disadvantage of this theory is that it can be imprecise, as multiple 
combinations of parties are minimal winning coalitions. Since open minimal range theory 
proves to be the most accurate theory, it appears that the ideological gap plays a role in 
determining whether a coalition with the radical right is formed; therefore, the main proposition 
of this study cannot be rejected on the basis of the results. In general, theories that take into 
account both office considerations and ideological considerations, such as open minimal range 
theory and minimal connected winning theory, seem to be the most accurate coalition theories 
in explaining cooperation between the radical right and the center right. 
Table 5: Results by case 
Case Government 
cooperation 
with radical 
right 
Open 
minimal 
range 
theory 
Minimal 
winning 
theory 
Minimum 
size 
theory 
Minimal 
connected 
winning 
theory 
Bargaining 
proposition 
theory 
Austria 
1999 
Yes Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted 
Austria 
2002 
Yes Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted Predicted 
Austria 
2006 
No Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Austria 
2008 
No Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted 
Denmark 
2001 
Yes Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted Not 
predicted 
Denmark 
2005 
Yes Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted Not 
predicted 
Denmark 
2007 
Yes Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted Not 
predicted 
Denmark 
2015 
Yes Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted Not 
predicted 
Finland 
2011 
No Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Finland 
2015 
Yes Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Predicted 
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Netherlands 
2002 
Yes Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Predicted 
Netherlands 
2003 
No Predicted Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Predicted Predicted 
Netherlands 
2010 
Yes Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted Predicted 
Norway 
2013 
Yes Predicted Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted Not 
predicted 
Sweden 
2010 
No Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted 
Sweden 
2014 
No Not 
predicted 
Not 
predicted 
Predicted Not 
predicted 
Predicted 
Total accuracy 11 out of 
16 
(68.8%) 
10 out of 
16 
(62.5%) 
6 out of 
16 
(37.5%) 
9 out of 
16 
(56.3%) 
6 out of 16 
(37.5%) 
Accuracy in cases with 
cooperation 
10 out of 
10 
(100%) 
10 out of 
10 
(100%) 
2 out of 
10 (20%) 
8 out of 
10 (80%) 
5 out of 10 
(50%) 
Accuracy in cases without 
cooperation 
1 out of 
6 
(16.7%) 
0 out of 
6 (0%) 
4 out of 6 
(66.7%) 
1 out of 6 
(16.7%) 
1 out of 6 
(16.7%) 
This table displays the findings of the comparison between open minimal range theory and other coalition 
theories, all on the basis of the one-dimensional model. 
 
4.2 The dimensionality of party competition 
As displayed in table 6, the one-dimensional model proves to be more accurate than the two-
dimensional model. Potential explanations for the two-dimensional model’s lower accuracy are 
discussed in the final section. This subsection first sheds light on the three cases that were 
predicted wrongly by both models. Subsequently, cases of failure of one of the models are 
analyzed; lastly, the cases predicted successfully by both models are discussed. 
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Table 6: Results by case 
Case Government 
cooperation with 
radical right 
One-dimensional 
model 
Two-dimensional 
model 
Austria 1999 Yes Predicted Predicted 
Austria 2002 Yes Predicted Predicted 
Austria 2006 No Not predicted Not predicted 
Austria 2008 No Not predicted Not predicted 
Denmark 2001 Yes Predicted Predicted 
Denmark 2005 Yes Predicted Not predicted 
Denmark 2007 Yes Predicted Not predicted 
Denmark 2015 Yes Predicted Not predicted 
Finland 2011 No Not predicted Not predicted 
Finland 2015 Yes Predicted Predicted 
Netherlands 2002 Yes Predicted Predicted 
Netherlands 2003 No Predicted Not predicted 
Netherlands 2010 Yes Predicted Predicted 
Norway 2013 Yes Predicted Predicted 
Sweden 2010 No Not predicted Predicted 
Sweden 2014 No Not predicted Predicted 
Total accuracy 11 out of 16 (68.8%) 9 out of 16 (56.3%) 
Accuracy in cases with cooperation 10 out of 10 (100%) 7 out of 10 (70%) 
Accuracy in cases without cooperation 1 out of 6 (16.7%) 2 out of 6 (33.3%) 
This table displays the findings of the comparison between the one-dimensional model and the two-dimensional 
model, both on the basis of open minimal range theory. 
 
Cases of failure of both models: Austria and Finland 
Two cases are illustrative of the inherent limitations to coalition formation theory. In Austria 
2006 and 2008, the radical right-wing FPÖ had engaged in government cooperation in the 
previous government, which had led to heavy electoral losses for the party. FPÖ leader Jörg 
Haider had left the party in 2005, founding the BZÖ (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, Alliance for 
the Future of Austria) and replacing the FPÖ in the coalition with the center-right ÖVP. 
Following the 2006 election, ÖVP and BZÖ lost their parliamentary majority. While ÖVP, 
FPÖ and BZÖ would technically have had a parliamentary majority in 2006 and 2008, and 
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while the ideological gap between ÖVP, FPÖ, and BZÖ would have been smaller than the 
ideological gap between ÖVP and SPÖ, personal issues and rows prevented the three parties 
from cooperating (Luther 2009, 1056-157). 
In many respects, the Dutch case of 2003, predicted correctly by the one-dimensional 
model, is similar. The CDA-LPF-VVD government, formed in 2002, proved to be short-lived. 
After only 87 days in office, center right CDA and VVD decided to give up on the coalition 
due to the scandals and conflicts within the coalition and the radical right LPF (Andeweg & 
Irwin 2009, 24). Therefore, and given the fact that the LPF was decimated in the 2003 election 
(receiving only 8 seats; the party had won 26 seats in the previous election), it was logical for 
VVD and CDA not to include the LPF in a new government, even if the ideological gap 
between VVD-CDA and LPF would still have been smaller than the ideological gap between 
VVD-CDA and the social liberal D66 party, with which a coalition was eventually formed. 
Still, the one-dimensional model technically managed to correctly predict this case, because a 
coalition between CDA and PvdA, without the radical right, would have had a smaller 
ideological gap. However, the CDA-VVD-D66 coalition eventually formed had a larger 
ideological gap than a potential coalition with the radical right. This indicates that neither the 
models of dimensionality nor the coalition theories in this study seem to be able to take into 
account factors that pertain to personal relationships, the perceived success or failure of former 
similar coalitions, or electoral defeats. Meanwhile, as illustrated by the aforementioned three 
cases, these factors prove to be relevant in politics time and again. This is a serious limitation 
to the models and coalition theories used in this study, and, for that matter, to any model or 
theory that is solely based on parties’ ideological positions. 
In the case of Finland 2011, both models predicted that a coalition with the radical right 
be formed, yet this did not happen. An oversized coalition was formed, leaving only two parties 
in opposition. The coalition included Socialists, Greens, Social Democrats, Conservatives, 
Christian Democrats, and the Social Liberal party of the Swedish-speaking minority. It 
excluded the Center Party (rooted in agrarian liberalism) and the radical right-wing Finns Party.  
Negotiations between the National Coalition Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Finns 
Party did take place after the 2011 election. This coalition would have been minimal winning, 
but both the one-dimensional and the two-dimensional model predict the formation of a 
different coalition with the Finns Party, namely one consisting of the Social Democratic Party, 
the Center Party and the Finns Party, excluding the National Coalition Party. 
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However, the Finns Party declared to leave the negotiating table over a single issue: 
bailing out Eurozone member states (Arter 2011, 1294).14 Radical right-wing parties are often 
characterized by their opposition toward the process of European integration, and Portugal’s 
proposed bailout package was perhaps the most hotly debated topic in the run-up to the election 
(Arter 2011, 1285). The differences between the National Coalition Party and the Finns Party 
on the topic of European integration are taken into account in both models, yet only as one out 
of many variables that together comprise the left-right dimension (in the one-dimensional 
model) and the GAL/TAN dimension (in the two-dimensional model). However, neither model 
takes into consideration the fact that parties do not necessarily attach the same importance to 
all political issues. On the basis of the idea that radical right-wing parties have primarily 
emerged in order to change the status-quo on (some) GAL/TAN issues, one might assume that 
the Finns Party attaches more importance to the GAL/TAN issue of European integration than 
the center-right, economy-oriented National Coalition Party. This could explain why both 
models sometimes fail to predict whether cooperation between the center right and the radical 
right will take place. 
In short, the Austrian cases of 2006 and 2008 are predicted wrongly by both models 
because of the inherent limitations to coalition theory, which does not take into account factors 
such as personal relationship, electorally strategic incentives or the dynamics of public opinion. 
In the Finnish case, electorally strategic incentives may have played a role too, but the failure 
of the two-dimensional model also seems to point toward a more specific problem, namely that 
parties have certain policy priorities and do not attach the same importance to all issues or to 
issues on both political dimensions. 
 
Failure of the two-dimensional model: the Danish cases 
The two-dimensional model accurately predicts 70% of the cases with cooperation and 33.3% 
of the cases without cooperation, thereby doing better than the one-dimensional model in cases 
where cooperation does not take place and clearly worse in cases where cooperation does take 
place. Apart from the three cases discussed in the previous subsection, the two-dimensional 
model fails to predict four other cases, three in Denmark and one in the Netherlands. 
In three out of four cases where government cooperation between the Danish radical 
right and center right occurred, the two-dimensional model does not predict such cooperation. 
                                                          
14 One must, however, be cautious in concluding that it was truly only this issue that caused the Finns Party to 
leave the negotiating table: while party leader Timo Soini declared so, other motives or issues, such as electoral 
considerations, could have played a role in this decision too. 
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Meanwhile, in all four Danish cases, the one-dimensional model successfully predicts that 
government cooperation with the radical right would take place. What is the cause of the two-
dimensional model’s failure? For the 2001 case, the two-dimensional model successfully 
predicts that the center right will opt for cooperation with the radical right DF (Dansk 
Folkeparti, Danish People’s Party). In 2005, this is not the case anymore. It appears that DF 
shifted to the left between 2001 and 2005 on the economic axis (from 7.3 to 6.1) while shifting 
to the right on the GAL/TAN axis (from 8.0 to 8.9), which, in both cases, meant moving away 
from the center right Liberal Party (Venstre). Meanwhile, the Liberal Party had moved in the 
opposite direction on the GAL/TAN axis (from 5.6 to 4.9). In later elections, DF shifted even 
more to the left economically, from 6.1 in 2005 to 4.8 in 2007 and 4.5 in 2015. What made the 
center right cooperate with DF despite all this? 
A potential explanation for the model’s failure goes as follows. It might be the case that 
the center-right parties focused on implementing their preferred set of policies on the left-right 
dimension, whereas the radical right attached more importance to implementing its preferred 
policies on the GAL/TAN dimension. The increasing saliency of issues related to immigration 
and European integration has contributed to the emergence of DF as a relevant political force 
in Danish politics (Andersen 2003, 6-8). Indeed, the tightening of immigration policies was 
widely considered the main achievement of DF in the first government DF supported 
(Andersen 2003, 4). Therefore, it could be argued that DF placed focus on implementing its 
preferred policies on the GAL/TAN axis. Meanwhile, the center-right Liberal Party and 
Conservative People’s Party have historically formed the economically right-wing alternative 
to the Social Democrats (Skidmore-Hess 2003, 90-91). As noted by Skidmore-Hess (2003, 
106), the center right-wing parties have sought to “weaken the state’s role as protector of social 
welfare” in the coalition with DF. Thus, it seems that the following “transaction” could have 
been at the root of Danish government cooperation between the center right and the radical 
right: the Liberals and Conservatives would implement most of their preferred policies on the 
economic dimension, which DF did not find as relevant as the GAL/TAN dimension. 
Meanwhile, DF would implement most of its preferred policies on the GAL/TAN dimension 
(most notably the tightening of immigration regulations), which Liberals and Conservatives 
did not find as relevant as the economic dimension. This could explain the fact that a large 
ideological gap between the Liberals and DF on the economic dimension did not deter the 
Liberals from engaging in government cooperation with DF. Just as in the Finnish case, it 
appears that the Danish radical right has different policy priorities than the Danish center right, 
which influences its strategic choices. However, in order to conclude so, more research would 
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be needed. For the model, this conclusion would imply that the two dimensions are not equally 
important to all political parties; hence, the ideological gap should be measured differently. 
 
Failure of the one-dimensional model: Sweden 
The one-dimensional model is most successful in predicting whether cooperation with the 
radical right will take place, having an impressive accuracy of 68.8%. Interestingly, it predicts 
that cooperation would occur in 15 out of 16 cases. As noted before, De Lange’s remark (2012, 
904) that minimal range theory is “particularly well placed” to distinguish between cases in 
which government cooperation will or will not take place because “it hardly ever predicts the 
inclusion of [radical right-wing parties] in government coalitions when this has not occurred” 
can certainly not be proved right on the basis of the one-dimensional model, because in five 
out of six cases where government cooperation did not occur, the one-dimensional model 
predicts that cooperation would take place. On the other hand, the one-dimensional model 
manages to predict all cases in which government cooperation did take place. 
 Apart from the cases discussed in the above part of this subsection, the one-dimensional 
model solely failed to predict two Swedish cases. For both 2010 and (particularly) 2014, the 
one-dimensional model displays a much smaller ideological gap between the center right 
parties and the radical right-wing Sweden Democrats (SD, Sverigedemokraterna) than between 
center right parties and left-wing parties. Such cooperation, however, did not take place, and 
the two-dimensional model, which successfully predicted non-cooperation, provides a 
plausible explanation for this: the center-right Moderate Party (M, Moderata Samlingspartiet) 
and, in particular, the Liberal People’s Party (F, Folkpartiet Liberalerna)15 hold centrist to left-
wing positions on the GAL/TAN dimension, whereas the Sweden Democrats have a far-right 
score on this axis: 8.3 in 2010 and 9.2 in 2014, rendering the ideological gap between the center 
right and the Sweden Democrats larger than the ideological gap between the center right and 
other parties. It seems that the Swedish cases prove correct the hypothetical examples in 
support of the two-dimensional model laid out in tables 1 and 2. The Sweden Democrats are 
placed far to the right on the GAL/TAN axis and at a centrist position on the economic axis, 
whereas the Moderate Party and the Liberal People’s Party are placed far to the right on the 
economic axis and at a centrist or left-wing position on the GAL/TAN axis. Therefore, these 
parties have a similar position in the one-dimensional model, which incorrectly predicts that 
government cooperation between the center right and the radical right would take place. In 
                                                          
15 This party is named The Liberals (L, Liberalerna) nowadays. 
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short, the Swedish cases truly prove the value of employing a two-dimensional model. While 
it is true that the two-dimensional model predicts correctly fewer cases than the one-
dimensional model, calling into question the usefulness of a two-dimensional model, the 
Swedish cases prove that the theoretical advantages of employing a two-dimensional model 
can be observed in reality. 
 
Predicted by both models: seven cases 
The two models prove to be very successful in the Austrian cases of 1999 and 2002, even 
showing the same picture in regard to the direction in which parties move. When comparing 
these two cases, both models reveal a clear rightward shift of the center right Austrian People’s 
Party (ÖVP, Österreichische Volkspartei) and the radical right-wing Austrian Freedom Party 
(FPÖ, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), who had been in a coalition since 1999, and a shift to 
the left of the opposition Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ, Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Österreichs) and Greens (die Grünen). On the basis of both models, the ÖVP’s choice to 
engage in a new round of government cooperation with the FPÖ, which was decimated in the 
2002 election, seems rational. 
 While predicted by both models, the 2002 case of the Netherlands raises questions with 
regard to the two-dimensional model. The center right People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie) and the radical right-wing Pim 
Fortuyn List (LPF, Lijst Pim Fortuyn) hold almost the same positions on both dimensions. The 
VVD has a score of 8.0 on the economic axis and 5.6 on the GAL/TAN axis, while the LPF is 
at 8.1 on the economic axis and 5.4 on the GAL/TAN axis, rendering the ideological gap 
between VVD and LPF extremely small (0.3). This indicates negligible ideological differences. 
However, during the campaign, VVD leader Hans Dijkstal voiced his staunch disagreement 
with Fortuyn on issues related to immigration and multiculturalism, and in the 1998-2002 
second “Purple” government Dijkstal had been more left-wing on these issues than his 
predecessor Frits Bolkestein, leaving an electoral void to the right of the VVD (Irwin & Van 
Holsteyn 2003, 45). In short, while the VVD and the LPF might have had similar aggregate 
positions on the GAL/TAN dimension, their views on the highly salient issue of immigration 
seemed much more divergent. This underpins the conclusion already drawn on the basis of the 
Danish and the Finnish cases, namely that radical right-wing parties attach much more 
importance to certain GAL/TAN issues, such as European integration and immigration, than 
to other GAL/TAN issues. Center right parties, however, often hold different positions on 
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issues paramount to radical right-wing parties, which can thwart potential government 
cooperation even if the parties’ GAL/TAN scores show a small ideological gap. 
 The models accurately predict government cooperation in the 2010 Dutch case. 
Remarkably, the one-dimensional model conveys very clearly why the Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA, Christen Democratisch Appèl) was divided on cooperation with the radical 
right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV, Partij voor de Vrijheid) yet eventually opted for such 
cooperation: the ideological gap between CDA and PVV was 0.1 smaller than the ideological 
gap between CDA and PvdA. The two-dimensional model, however, calculates the exact same 
GAL/TAN position (7.1) for both PVV and CDA, while both parties have a very different 
focus. This problem with the large scope of the GAL/TAN dimension becomes even clearer 
when comparing the PVV to the ChristianUnion (CU, ChristenUnie), a small Orthodox 
Protestant party: the PVV’s positions are 5.2 (economic dimension) and 7.1 (GAL/TAN 
dimension), whereas the CU’s positions are 5.0 (economic dimension) and 7.4 (GAL/TAN 
dimension). The ideological gap between the two parties would be 0.5. However, while the 
PVV has this high GAL/TAN score because of its views on immigration, multiculturalism and 
European integration, the CU is considered right-wing on this axis because of its socially 
conservative positions, for instance regarding abortion and euthanasia (Hooghe et al. 2002; 
Bakker et al. 2006; 2010; 2014).  
 This points at a bigger problem with the GAL/TAN dimension, not solely pertaining to 
the Dutch cases. While the GAL/TAN dimension implies a certain cohesion between parties’ 
viewpoints on this axis, this does not necessarily have to be the case in reality. If this dimension 
lacks internal cohesion, a small ideological gap between parties on the GAL/TAN axis can be 
misleading. In many cases, Christian or conservative parties have high TAN scores that 
diminish the ideological gap between Christian or conservative parties and radical right-wing 
parties, but the supposed similarities on the GAL/TAN dimension do not mean that these 
parties are ideologically close on the same GAL/TAN issues. Moreover, many Christian or 
conservative parties appear to hold very different positions than radical right-wing parties on 
GAL/TAN issues salient to radical right-wing parties, such as European integration (Hooghe 
et al. 2002; Bakker et al. 2006; 2010; 2014). Apart from the Dutch CDA and CU, other such 
cases include the Finnish and Swedish Center Party, the Finnish Christian Democrats and the 
Norwegian Christian People’s Party. This is a serious weakness of the GAL/TAN dimension, 
raising the question whether it accurately reflects the ideological gap between parties. 
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
The research question of this study was formulated as follows: “Does the ideological gap 
between parties explain the variation in government cooperation outcomes between center-
right parties and radical right-wing parties in Western Europe?” The results of this study reveal 
that open minimal range theory is more accurate than any other coalition theory and that the 
ideological gap is indeed often a successful predictor of whether cooperation between the 
radical right and the center right occurs. The main conclusion of the comparative analysis of 
coalition theories, however, should be that policy-oriented coalition theories, such as open 
minimal range theory, are much better at predicting whether cooperation with the radical right 
will take place than office-oriented theories. 
The one-dimensional model has proven to be more successful in predicting formation 
processes than the two-dimensional model. While the one-dimensional model predicts 
correctly 68.8% of the cases, a figure resembling De Lange’s 70% in a study not taking into 
account processes in which cooperation with the radical right would eventually not take place, 
the two-dimensional model predicts just over half the cases correctly with an accuracy figure 
of 56.3%. That said, both models have their drawbacks. Three out of sixteen formation 
processes are predicted wrongly by both of the models; two of these, the Austrian cases, cannot 
be explained by any model in the field of coalition theory, clearly showing the limitations of 
this rational choice-based approach. Ultimately, other variables than ideology, such as personal 
relationships, public perception and electorally strategic factors, are at play too. It is also unable 
to explain historically rooted patterns of cooperation, such as Finnish oversized coalitions and 
Danish “bloc politics” – for instance, the idea of a Danish coalition consisting of both the 
Liberals and the Social Democrats, predicted by open minimal range theory in three cases, 
would be considered ludicrous (Green-Pedersen & Hoffmann Thomsen 2005, 156-159). At the 
same time, one should avoid the pitfall of rejecting the hypothesis of this study on the basis of 
the existence of some deviant cases: while such cases do weaken the probabilistic hypothesis, 
they do not necessarily render the theory useless (Lijphart 1971, 686). 
The models used in this study have advantages and disadvantages. By aggregating 
parties’ positions on material and immaterial issues, the one-dimensional model fails to explain 
certain cases. It predicts that government cooperation would occur in 15 out of 16 cases, 
providing a wrong prediction in five out of six cases where cooperation did not take place. The 
two-dimensional model failed more often than the one-dimensional model. The inclusion of 
the GAL/TAN dimension proved to be both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it was 
29 
 
useful in explaining two Swedish cases that the one-dimensional model could not explain, and, 
hence, in showing the limitations of the usefulness of the one-dimensional model. On the other 
hand, the composition of the GAL/TAN dimension appears to be problematic for the very same 
reasons as the one-dimensional model proved to be problematic: it is composed of variables 
that are sometimes wholly unrelated to each other, thereby jeopardizing the accuracy of the 
ideological gap eventually predicted. Moreover, several cases suggest that radical right-wing 
parties are especially interested in changing the status-quo on GAL/TAN issues that are 
commonly associated with these parties, such as immigration, while being far more willing to 
compromise on other GAL/TAN issues and economic issues. However, more research on this 
subject would be needed in order to conclude so. Another potential criticism of the two-
dimensional model is that it classifies issues as either economic or GAL/TAN, whereas many 
issues, such as immigration, have both economic and socio-cultural aspects in reality; 
distinguishing between these aspects can be difficult.  
Because of the fact that the one-dimensional model proves to be more accurate than the 
two-dimensional model, the assertion that political competition in Western Europe takes place 
along two dimensions cannot be supported on the basis of this study. Still, one should be careful 
in stating that Van der Brug and Van Spanje were right in stating that voters’ preferences might 
be two-dimensional, yet political competition still takes place along one dimension. First, the 
comparison between the two models of dimensionality was of an explorative nature; if the 
“second”, socio-cultural dimension were to be operationalized differently, results could be 
markedly different. Second, one should not forget that the two-dimensional model proved to 
be valuable in the Swedish cases, which were predicted incorrectly by the one-dimensional 
model. It could very well be possible that in some party systems, competition does take place 
along two dimensions. Still, the results of this thesis provide support for the idea that employing 
a one-dimensional model might have its drawbacks, yet is in many cases the best option. 
It is important to note that there are alternative explanations for the variation in 
government cooperation outcomes with the radical right. Some factors not taken into account 
by the ideological gap, or, indeed, by coalition theory as an approach, might play a role in 
center-right parties’ considerations in regard to such cooperation. For instance, parties with a 
fascist past that have moderated their views over time and are now “ordinary” radical right-
wing parties in terms of policy positions, such as the Sweden Democrats, may still be viewed 
differently both by the public and by other parties from radical right-wing parties that were 
founded only recently and have no history of views that are considered “beyond the pale”, such 
as the Danish People’s Party (Rydgren 2004, 496). The ideological gap between the radical 
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right and the center right might be similar in these cases, but the general perception of a party 
could be very different, influencing actors’ decisions. This could be studied on the basis of 
discourse analysis in newspapers and surveys or interviews among politicians. Moreover, it 
could be a radical right-wing party’s discourse instead of its actual policy positions that center-
right parties consider too problematic for cooperation. For instance, when the leader of the 
Dutch radical right-wing PVV made his followers chant that they wanted “fewer Moroccans”, 
a spokesperson of the center-right VVD declared that because of this statement, no cooperation 
between the two parties would take place anymore, including government cooperation, until 
the PVV would retract it (Van Outeren 2016). Yet, the ideological gap between the VVD and 
the PVV had not changed; it can therefore not explain the VVD’s shift in attitude toward 
cooperation with the PVV. A third alternative explanation could be that some center right 
parties are more internally divided than others on the subject of government cooperation with 
the radical right, which might not be reflected in these party’s ideological positions. 
 All in all, one can conclude that the ideological gap explains a majority of cases in 
which government cooperation between the radical right and the center right can take place, 
being an excellent predictor of whether such cooperation occurs. However, there are multiple 
cases it cannot explain, and another policy-oriented coalition theory – minimal connected 
winning theory – proved to be almost as accurate as open minimal range theory. Future research 
in the field of government cooperation between center-right parties and radical right-wing 
parties could focus on the role that issues such as immigration and European integration, which 
radical right-wing parties deem more important than other issues, play in government formation 
processes. Such issues are at the heart of radical right-wing parties’ identities as nativist, 
authoritarian and populist. One could, for instance, calculate the ideological gaps between 
center-right parties and radical right-wing parties on these issues to test whether they determine 
the outcomes of government formation processes. Moreover, scholars of coalition theory could 
take into account party size within the framework of open minimal range theory. On the basis 
of the theory as employed in this study, party size plays only a limited role. However, if, for 
example, a Liberal and a Conservative party are extremely close ideologically, yet barely miss 
out on winning a parliamentary majority, it might be more beneficial in terms of policy for the 
Liberal Party to try and include a small, ideologically distant party (a Green party, for instance) 
and widen the policy range of the coalition instead of entering a grand coalition with the equally 
large Social Democrats and missing out on the opportunity to cooperate with the ideologically 
close Conservatives, even if the ideological gap of a Liberal-Conservative-Green coalition 
would theoretically be larger than the gap of a Liberal-Social Democratic government. 
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If a coalition theory is used for such research, it is strongly recommended to employ a 
policy-oriented theory that takes into account the ideological distance between parties: the 
results of this study firmly point at the accuracy of such theories. Outside the field of coalition 
theory, the validity of the aforementioned alternative explanations could be studied. In any 
case, scholars of cooperation between the center right and the radical right will not suffer from 
“small N”-related problems anytime soon: radical right-wing parties’ increasing electoral 
success makes it likely that many ideological gaps will be bridged in the near future. 
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Appendix: Results by case and model 
Austria 1999, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Österreichs 
(SPÖ) 
4.0 35.5 
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (FPÖ) 
7.9 28.4 
Österreichische 
Volkspartei (ÖVP) 
6.2 28.4 
Die Grünen – Die 
Grüne Alternative 
(GRÜNE) 
2.9 7.7 
Ideological gaps  ÖVP-FPÖ: 1.7 
 ÖVP-SPÖ: 2.2 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct 
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Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 220. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Austria 1999, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
SPÖ 4.2 4.0 35.5 
FPÖ 6.4 7.2 28.4 
ÖVP 6.2 6.5 28.4 
GRÜNE 3.0 2.0 7.7 
Ideological 
gaps 
 ÖVP-FPÖ: 0.6 
 ÖVP-SPÖ: 3.2 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right takes 
place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 220. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Austria 2002, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
ÖVP 7.0 43.2 
SPÖ 3.8 37.7 
FPÖ 8.6 9.8 
GRÜNE 2.8 9.3 
Ideological gaps  ÖVP-FPÖ: 1.6 
 ÖVP-SPÖ: 3.2 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 220. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
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Austria 2002, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
ÖVP 7.6 8.3 43.2 
SPÖ 3.4 3.3 37.7 
FPÖ 7.3 9.0 9.8 
GRÜNE 2.8 1.4 9.3 
Ideological 
gaps 
 ÖVP-FPÖ: 0.8 
 ÖVP-SPÖ: 6.5 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right takes 
place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 220. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Austria 2006/2008, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
2006 
Percentage 
of seats 
2008 
SPÖ 3.8 37.2 31.1 
ÖVP 7.0 36.1 27.9 
GRÜNE 2.2 11.5 10.9 
FPÖ 9.7 11.5 18.6 
Bündnis Zukunft 
Österreich (BZÖ) 
8.8 3.8 11.5 
Ideological gaps  ÖVP-FPÖ-BZÖ: 2.7 
 ÖVP-SPÖ: 3.2 
Prediction 2006 Cooperation with radical right takes place, 
incorrect 
Prediction 2008 Cooperation with radical right takes place, 
incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 220. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
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Austria 2006/2008, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
2006 
Percentage 
of seats 
2008 
SPÖ 2.8 3.5 37.2 31.1 
ÖVP 6.8 7.7 36.1 27.9 
GRÜNE 2.6 0.8 11.5 10.9 
FPÖ 4.8 9.7 11.5 18.6 
BZÖ 6.0 8.8 3.8 11.5 
Ideological 
gaps 2006 
and 2008 
 ÖVP-FPÖ-BZÖ: 2.8 
 ÖVP-SPÖ: 5.8 
Prediction 
2006 
Cooperation with radical right takes place, 
incorrect 
Prediction 
2008 
Cooperation with radical right takes place, 
incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 220. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Denmark 2001, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
Venstre, Danmarks 
Liberale Parti (V) 
7.1 32.0 
Socialdemokratiet 
(SD) 
3.9 29.7 
Dansk Folkeparti 
(DF) 
8.9 12.6 
Det Konservative 
Folkeparti (KF) 
7.1 9.1 
Socialistisk 
Folkeparti (SF) 
2.3 6.9 
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Radikale Venstre 
(RV) 
5.1 5.1 
Enhedslisten (EL) 1.0 2.3 
Kristeligt Folkeparti 
(KrF) 
5.4 2.3 
Ideological gaps  V-DF-KF: 1.8 
 V-SD: 3.2 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 556. Greenlandic and Faroe Islands seats are not taken into 
account in all Danish cases. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = 
radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
Denmark 2001, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
V 7.7 5.6 32.0 
SD 3.4 5.0 29.7 
DF 7.3 8.0 12.6 
KF 7.3 6.0 9.1 
SF 2.1 2.6 6.9 
RV 3.9 3.4 5.1 
EL 1.0 2.3 2.3 
KrF 5.7 5.4 2.3 
Ideological 
gaps 
 V-DF-KF: 2.4 
 V-SD: 4.3 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right takes 
place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 556. Greenlandic and Faroe Islands seats are not taken into 
account in all Danish cases. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = 
radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
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Denmark 2005, one-dimensional model 
 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
V 7.4 29.7 
SD 4.0 26.9 
DF 8.9 13.7 
KF 7.0 10.3 
RV 5.1 9.7 
SF 2.3 6.3 
EL16 ? 3.4 
Ideological gaps  V-DF-KF: 1.9 
 V-SD: 3.4 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 556. Greenlandic and Faroe Islands seats are not taken into 
account in all Danish cases. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = 
radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
Denmark 2005, two-dimensional model 
 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
V 7.9 4.9 29.7 
SD 3.7 4.4 26.9 
DF 6.1 8.9 13.7 
KF 6.9 7.2 10.3 
RV 5.3 2.5 9.7 
SF 2.0 2.1 6.3 
                                                          
16 While EL obtained seats in 2001, and while the party was included in the 1999 CHES survey, its scores are 
missing in the 2002 CHES survey. Therefore, the ideological position of EL in the 2005 election is unknown. 
However, given the party’s ideological position in the 1999 and 2006 surveys, it can be assumed that the party 
had a position to the left of SF and would be an unlikely partner for any center right coalition. 
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EL17 ? ? 3.4 
Ideological 
gaps 
 V-DF-KF: 4.4 
 V-SD: 4.2 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right does not 
take place, incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 556. Greenlandic and Faroe Islands seats are not taken into 
account in all Danish cases. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = 
radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
Denmark 2007, one-dimensional model 
 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
V 7.2 26.3 
SD 4.1 25.7 
DF 7.7 14.3 
SF 2.3 13.1 
KF 7.1 10.3 
RV 4.8 5.1 
EL 1.0 2.3 
Ideological gaps  V-DF-KF: 0.6 
 V-SD: 3.1 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 556. Greenlandic and Faroe Islands seats are not taken into 
account in all Danish cases. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = 
radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 See footnote 16. 
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Denmark 2007, two-dimensional model 
 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
V 6.6 4.9 26.3 
SD 3.6 4.1 25.7 
DF 4.8 7.6 14.3 
SF 2.3 2.1 13.1 
KF 7.5 6.8 10.3 
RV 5.8 2.0 5.1 
EL 1.1 1.6 2.3 
Ideological 
gaps 
 V-DF-KF: 3.8 
 V-SD: 3.1 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right does 
not take place, incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 556. Greenlandic and Faroe Islands seats are not taken into 
account in all Danish cases. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = 
radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
Denmark 2015, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
SD 4.4 26.9 
DF 6.9 21.1 
V 7.0 19.4 
EL 1.2 8.0 
Liberal Alliance 
(LA) 
7.9 7.4 
Alternativet (A)18 ? 5.1 
RV 5.7 4.6 
                                                          
18 The Alternative is a party that contested in an election for the first time in 2015. It has not been taken into 
account by CHES in the 2014 dataset. Given its size and its left-wing profile, it seems unlikely that a coalition 
with a smaller ideological gap could have been formed with this party.  
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SF 2.9 4.0 
KF 7.0 3.4 
Ideological gaps  DF-V-LA-KF: 1.0 
 SD-V-RV: 2.6 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Gani 2015. Greenlandic and Faroe Islands seats are not taken into account in all Danish 
cases. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. 
Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
Denmark 2015, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
SD 3.9 5.2 26.9 
DF 4.5 8.4 21.1 
V 7.3 5.7 19.4 
EL 1.0 2.1 8.0 
LA 9.1 2.6 7.4 
A19 ? ? 5.1 
RV 6.5 1.9 4.6 
SF 2.3 3.1 4.0 
KF 7.6 7.2 3.4 
Ideological 
gaps 
 DF-V-LA-KF: 7.4 
 SD-V-RV: 5.1 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right does not 
take place, incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Gani 2015. Greenlandic and Faroe Islands seats are not taken into account in all Danish 
cases. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. 
Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 See footnote 18. 
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Finland 2011, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
Kansallinen 
Kokoomus (KOK) 
7.5 22.1 
Suomen 
Sosialidemokraattinen 
Puolue (SDP) 
4.0 21.1 
Perussuomalaiset 
(PS) 
5.4 19.6 
Suomen Keskusta 
(KESK) 
5.7 17.6 
Vasemmistoliitto 
(VAS) 
2.2 7.0 
Vihreä Liitto (VIHR) 4.6 5.0 
Svenska Folkpartiet i 
Finland (SFP) 
6.8 4.5 
Kristillisdemokraatit 
(KD) 
6.6 3.0 
Ideological gaps  PS-SDP-KESK: 1.7 
 KOK-SDP-KESK: 3.5 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Reuters 2011. Åland seat not taken into account in all Finish cases. Bold = center right 
party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred 
partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
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Finland 2011, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
KOK 7.6 4.5 22.1 
SDP 3.6 4.7 21.1 
PS 4.3 7.5 19.6 
KESK 5.3 6.4 17.6 
VAS 2.0 3.4 7.0 
VIHR 4.4 2.1 5.0 
SFP 7.4 4.1 4.5 
KD 4.7 8.1 3.0 
Ideological 
gaps 
 PS-SDP-KESK: 3.3 
 KOK-SDP-KESK: 4.5 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right takes 
place, incorrect20 
Source seat percentage: Reuters 2011. Åland seat not taken into account in all Finish cases. Bold = center right 
party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred 
partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
Finland 2015, one-dimensional model 
 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
KESK 5.6 24.6 
PS 5.1 19.1 
KOK 7.7 18.6 
SDP 4.0 17.1 
VIHR 4.4 7.5 
VAS 1.9 6.0 
                                                          
20 The minimal winning coalition with the smallest policy range is one between SDP, PS and KESK, excluding 
KOK. This outcome is therefore somewhat special, because a center-right party is excluded and government 
cooperation between another center right party, a radical right-wing party and a non-right-wing party is 
predicted. 
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SFP 7.4 4.5 
KD 6.2 2.5 
Ideological gaps  KESK-PS-KOK: 2.6 
 KESK-KOK-SDP: 3.7 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct21 
Source seat percentage: Yle Uutiset 2015. Åland seat not taken into account in all Finish cases. Bold = center 
right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred 
partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
Finland 2015, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
KESK 5.4 7.0 24.6 
PS 4.1 9.1 19.1 
KOK 8.2 4.8 18.6 
SDP 3.4 3.2 17.1 
VIHR 4.4 0.8 7.5 
VAS 1.7 1.9 6.0 
SFP 7.3 2.1 4.5 
KD 5.4 9.0 2.5 
Ideological 
gaps 
 KESK-PS-KOK: 5.9 
 KESK-KOK-SDP: 6.1 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right takes 
place, correct22 
Source seat percentage: Yle Uutiset 2015. Åland seat not taken into account in all Finish cases. Bold = center 
right party included in a potential minimal winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred 
partner for the center right on the basis of the model. 
 
 
                                                          
21 Like in the two-dimensional model on the basis of the 2011 election, a coalition with SDP, PS and KESK is 
predicted. The coalition eventually formed, however, consisted of KESK, PS and KOK. 
22 The minimal winning coalition with the smallest policy range is one between SDP, PS and KESK, excluding 
KOK. This outcome is therefore somewhat special, because a center-right party is excluded and government 
cooperation between another center right party, a radical right-wing party and a non-right-wing party is 
predicted. 
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Netherlands 2002/2003, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
2002 
Percentage 
of seats 
2003 
Christen 
Democratisch Appèl 
(CDA) 
6.1 28.7 29.3 
Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 8.4 17.3 5.3 
Volkspartij voor 
Vrijheid en 
Democratie (VVD) 
7.4 16.0 18.7 
Partij van de Arbeid 
(PvdA) 
4.0 15.3 28.0 
GroenLinks (GL) 2.5 6.7 5.3 
Socialistische Partij 
(SP) 
1.6 6.0 6.023 
Democraten 66 (D66)  4.6 4.7 4.0 
ChristenUnie (CU) 6.6 2.7 2.0 
Staatskundig 
Gereformeerde Partij 
(SGP) 
8.0 1.3 1.3 
Leefbaar Nederland 
(LN)24 
? 1.3 0.0 
Ideological gaps 2002  CDA-LPF-VVD: 2.3 
 CDA-VVD-PvdA: 3.4 
Ideological gaps 2003  CDA-LPF-VVD: 2.3 
 CDA-PvdA: 2.1 
Prediction 2002 Cooperation with radical right takes place, 
correct 
Prediction 2003 Cooperation with radical right does not 
take place, correct 
                                                          
23 Nohlen and Stöver mention a percentage of 2.7%. This is incorrect (Databank Verkiezingsuitslagen 2016). 
24 New party, not part of the CHES dataset. 
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Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 1415. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Netherlands 2002/2003, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
2002 
Percentage 
of seats 
2003 
CDA 6.2 6.9 28.7 29.3 
LPF 8.1 5.4 17.3 5.3 
VVD 8.0 5.6 16.0 18.7 
PvdA 3.8 3.3 15.3 28.0 
GL 1.9 1.4 6.7 5.3 
SP 0.8 3.3 6.0 6.025 
D66 5.1 1.4 4.7 4.0 
CU 5.3 8.8 2.7 2.0 
SGP 6.5 9.4 1.3 1.3 
LN26 ? ? 1.3 0.0 
Ideological 
gaps 2002 
 CDA-LPF-VVD: 2.3 
 CDA-VVD-PvdA: 5.5 
Ideological 
gaps 2003 
 CDA-LPF-VVD: 2.3 
 CDA-PvdA: 4.3 
Prediction 
2006 
Cooperation with radical right takes place, correct 
Prediction 
2008 
Cooperation with radical right takes place, 
incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Nohlen & Stöver 2010, 1415. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Nohlen and Stöver mention a percentage of 2.7%. This is incorrect (Databank Verkiezingsuitslagen 2016). 
26 New party, not part of the CHES dataset. 
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Netherlands 2010, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
VVD 7.9 20.7 
PvdA 3.9 20.0 
PVV 8.6 16.0 
CDA 6.3 14.0 
SP 1.6 10.0 
D66 5.0 6.7 
GL 2.6 6.7 
CU 5.4 3.3 
SGP 7.8 1.3 
Partij voor de Dieren 
(PvdD) 
3.4 1.3 
Ideological gaps  VVD-PVV-CDA: 2.3 
 VVD-PvdA-CDA: 4.0 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Van Holsteyn 2011, 413. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Netherlands 2010, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
VVD 8.3 4.8 20.7 
PvdA 3.6 4.0 20.0 
PVV 5.2 7.1 16.0 
CDA 6.5 7.1 14.0 
SP 1.5 5.2 10.0 
D66 5.5 1.6 6.7 
GL 3.0 1.9 6.7 
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CU 5.0 7.4 3.3 
SGP 6.5 9.3 1.3 
PvdD 3.6 3.8 1.3 
Ideological 
gaps 
 VVD-PVV-CDA: 3.9 
 VVD-PvdA-CDA: 5.6 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right takes 
place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Van Holsteyn 2011, 413. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Norway 2013, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
Arbeiderpartiet (Ap) 3.7 32.5 
Høyre (H) 7.4 28.4 
Fremskrittspartiet 
(FrP) 
8.2 17.2 
Kristelig Folkeparti 
(KrF) 
5.2 5.9 
Senterpartiet (Sp) 3.9 5.9 
Venstre (V) 5.4 5.3 
Sosialistisk 
Venstreparti (SV) 
1.8 4.1 
Miljøpartiet de 
Grønne (MDG) 
2.5 0.6 
Ideological gaps  H-FrP-KrF-V: 3.0 
 Ap-H: 3.7 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Valgresultat Norge 2013. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
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Norway 2013, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
Ap 3.7 4.6 32.5 
H 7.8 5.3 28.4 
FrP 7.7 7.3 17.2 
KrF 5.2 8.2 5.9 
Sp 3.6 6.1 5.9 
V 5.8 3.7 5.3 
SV 1.7 2.1 4.1 
MDG 2.3 3.0 0.6 
Ideological 
gaps 
 H-FrP-KrF-V: 5.2 
 Ap-H: 5.5 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right takes 
place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Valgresultat Norge 2013. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Sweden 2010, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
Arbetarepartiet-
Socialdemokraterna 
(S) 
3.3 32.1 
Moderata 
Samlingspartiet (M) 
7.3 30.7 
Miljöpartiet de 
Gröna (MP) 
3.5 7.2 
Folkpartiet 
Liberalerna (FP) 
7.1 6.9 
Centerpartiet (C) 7.0 6.6 
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Sverigedemokraterna 
(SD) 
8.4 6.0 
Vänsterpartiet (V) 1.4 4.5 
Kristdemokraterna 
(KD) 
7.1 2.5 
Ideological gap  M-FP-C-SD-KD: 1.4 
 M-MP-FP-C-KD: 3.8 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Valmyndigheten 2010. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
Sweden 2010, two-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
S 3.5 4.2 32.1 
M 7.5 5.2 30.7 
MP 3.6 2.8 7.2 
FP 7.6 3.7 6.9 
C 7.3 5.0 6.6 
SD 5.5 8.3 6.0 
V 1.2 3.1 4.5 
KD 7.1 7.0 2.5 
Ideological 
gaps 
 M-FP-C-SD-KD: 5.1 
 S-M: 4.1 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right does not 
place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Valmyndigheten 2010. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model.  
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Sweden 2014, one-dimensional model 
Party Left-right 
(gen) 
placement 
Percentage of 
seats 
S 3.8 32.4 
M 7.4 24.1 
SD 7.8 14.0 
MP 3.3 7.2 
C 7.2 6.3 
V 1.7 6.0 
FP 7.0 5.4 
KD 7.5 4.6 
Ideological gap  M-SD-C-FP-KD: 0.8 
 S-M: 3.6 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right 
takes place, incorrect 
Source seat percentage: Valmyndigheten 2014. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
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Sweden 2014, two-dimensional model 
 
Party Left-right 
(econ) 
placement 
GAL/TAN 
placement 
Percentage 
of seats 
S 3.4 3.6 32.4 
M 7.7 4.7 24.1 
SD 5.4 9.2 14.0 
MP 3.5 1.6 7.2 
C 7.7 3.0 6.3 
V 1.4 2.0 6.0 
FP 7.4 3.1 5.4 
KD 7.1 7.0 4.6 
Ideological 
gaps 
 M-SD-C-FP-KD: 6.6 
 S-M: 4.4 
Prediction Cooperation with radical right does not 
place, correct 
Source seat percentage: Valmyndigheten 2014. Bold = center right party included in a potential minimal 
winning coalition. Italics = radical right party. Green = the preferred partner for the center right on the basis of 
the model. 
 
 
 
